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Abstract
Background: Research estimates of inadvertent harm to patients undergoing modern healthcare demonstrate a
serious problem. Much attention has been paid to analysis of the causes of error and harm, but researchers have
typically focussed either on human interaction and communication or on systems design, without fully considering the
other components. Existing models for analysing harm are principally derived from theory and the analysis of individual
incidents, and their practical value is often limited by the assumption that identifying causal factors automatically
suggests solutions. We suggest that new models based on observation are required to help analyse healthcare safety
problems and evaluate proposed solutions. We propose such a model which is directed at “microsystem” level (Ward
and operating theatre), and which frames problems and solutions within three dimensions.
Methods: We have developed a new, simple, model of safety in healthcare systems, based on analysis of real
problems seen in surgical systems, in which influences on risk at the “microsystem” level are described in terms of
only 3 dimensions - technology, system and culture. We used definitions of these terms which are similar or
identical to those used elsewhere in the safety literature, and utilised a set of formal empirical and deductive
processes to derive the model. The “3D” model assumes that new risks arise in an unpredictable stochastic manner,
and that the three defined dimensions are interactive, in an unconstrained fashion. We illustrated testing of the
model, using analysis of a small number of incidents in a surgical environment for which we had detailed
prospective observational data.
Results: The model appeared to provide useful explanation and categorisation of real events. We made predictions
based on the model, which are experimentally verifiable, and propose further work to test and refine it.
Conclusion: We suggest that, if calibrated by application to a large incident dataset, the 3D model could form the
basis for a quantitative statistical method for estimating risk at microsystem levels in many acute healthcare settings.
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Background
“Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are
useful”
George AP Box
Safety remains a major problem
It is only in the last 2 decades that it has become accepta-
ble to admit that modern healthcare causes harm to
patients. Early writers who drew attention to this, like
Ivan Ilich [1], were dismissed as dystopian, whilst others,
who raised the problems of healthcare harm after experi-
encing personal tragedy, were clearly not neutral obser-
vers. The medical and nursing professions have had
difficulty in looking squarely at this issue, since our pro-
fessional cultures contain a fundamental assumption of
absolute commitment to selfless service, and the most
demanding standards of performance. This mindset
made it difficult to acknowledge the problem of patient
harm, but eventually careful retrospective analysis in the
USA showed convincing evidence of harm caused by
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other advanced health care systems now suggest that this
i sp r o b a b l yac o n s i d e r a b l eu n d er-estimate [4-6]. Regula-
tory authorities have subsequently commissioned reports
[7,8] which have identified inadvertent harm as a major
healthcare problem, and called for urgent reform. In this
paper we offer an early presentation of a conceptual
model that seeks to link the high frequency of incidents
and near misses to individual contributing events attribu-
table to causes within care Microsystems. We discuss the
possibility that this could be developed into a statistically
explorable model for error analysis, and prediction of
intervention effects.
Like early treatments for infections based on inade-
quate theoretical understanding [9], our early efforts to
reduce healthcare-related harm have often had limited
success [10]. Analysis of the problems encountered dur-
ing such attempts reveals complex interactions between
the objects of interventions - for example work systems -
and other aspects of the organisation, such as staff cul-
ture [11]. Thus, understanding and predicting complex
systemic interactions is important for the design of effec-
tive interventions. A variety of theoretical models and
frameworks have been proposed to help classify, under-
stand and analyse the causes of error and harm in health-
care. The Reason “Swiss Cheese” model [12] has had an
important role in illustrating the complexity of error, and
providing an easily understandable conceptual approach.
Amalberti [13] and Hollnagel [14] offer other examples
of theoretically plausible and partially validated socio-
technical conceptual models, although the latter has not
been specifically tested in health care. Analysis frame-
works for individual events or collections of incidents,
such as the London protocol [15] aim to describe the
influence of the entire range of factors which may contri-
bute to errors. Carayon and Smith propose a 5 dimen-
sional model of influences, which includes Environment
and Organisation, Tasks, People and Tools [16]. The
WHO classification system is also based on a single inci-
dent classification system, with explicitly described cate-
gories [17]. Unfortunately, these models tend to be
conceptual and communicative rather than statistically
testable or predictive. They are mainly based either on
human factors theory or analysis of small numbers of
unusual incidents with serious consequences. Because
they attempt to explain incidents comprehensively, they
inevitably include concepts and influences which are
either very difficult to define and evaluate (such as “man-
agement ethos”) or very difficult to change in real health
care practice (such as Organisation or People). This can
easily result in unclear conclusions or infeasible recom-
mendations. A model which would allow analysis of
problems at the microsystem level, and which avoided or
compartmentalised such unmanageable issues would be
potentially very useful. Furthermore, the emphasis on
understanding individual events means that models
designed and deployed to describe major “accidents” can
provide over-specific analyses, and do not always lend
themselves well to multi-incident analysis. This may be
sufficient for safety in some domains (especially trans-
port, where one “error” can have an impact on hundreds
of passengers), but the risk with a root-cause analysis
model is of providing event-specific solutions rather than
identifying common causes. Observational research work
has broadly identified the recurring types and sources of
everyday incidents that may eventually contribute to
more serious incidents [18-21], but such frequent events
cannot be addressed using the complex analyses generally
required by theoretical models. Arguably the most
obvious failure of existing models is to predict the effects
of different interventions. We believe that there is there-
fore a need for a practical healthcare safety model which
clarifies the relative importance of, and interactions
between, the factors affecting patient safety at the “micro-
system” level where patient care is actually delivered, and
which can be used to understand both individual and
recurring events.
Methods
To develop our model, we used the following 6
propositions:
We should be able to define any concept we use in
the model, and the definitions should be consistent with
current usage.
￿ We should accept concepts or influences into the
model only if their relationship with harm has been
verified in well designed experiments, or high-quality
formal observational studies.
￿ We should not accept any influences which can be
completely described as a composite of other more
fundamental influences
￿ We should use only as many influences as are
required to explain observed occurrences (Occam’s
razor)
￿ We should test the model repeatedly against
observed reality to see if it provides a satisfactory
explanation of what occurred.
￿ We should refine the model by using it to make
predictions and comparing these with future real
events.
Using these principles, we contend that System, Culture
and Technology represent three concepts which have
considerable experimental support as influences on error
and safety [20,22-27], and which between them can
encompass most of the manageable influences active
at the microsystem level. The concept of healthcare
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measures for it have been developed [28-30]. The impor-
tance of systems analysis has been repeatedly emphasised
in reviews of the scientific evidence on healthcare
safety31,32]. Technology can enhance safety, for example
via decision support [33] and “smart” technology to
improve drug administration [34], or increase dangers.
All three terms have been previously defined in various
ways, but in order to avoid confusion we have chosen
here to use the definitions which appear best validated
and most widely accepted in the current literature.
Work systemsare the ways in which work is conducted,
including the formal organisation of tasks and responsi-
bilities as well as the precise manner of achieving them.
It therefore incorporates the manner of information
handover, standard procedures for preparing and using
equipment, and the pathways by which patients move
through the system. This definition encompasses both
Donabedian’s dimensions of process and of structure [35].
Workplace culturehas been defined in various ways
[28-30]. Here we mean the values, attitudes and assump-
tions which guide and underpin staff relationships and
communication. This includes local notions of hierarchy,
loyalty and professionalism, and perceptions of the work
environment, patients, other staff groups and management.
Technologyis the equipment used to carry out the
tasks assigned. It includes both complex and simple
instruments and tools, but also drugs, medication and
information technology.
Summary of model
We propose a model of healthcare safety in which threats
to patient safety at the ward, unit or theatre level can be
analysed in terms of the 3 dimensions of System, Culture
and Technology. Based on the conceptual model pro-
posed by Reason [12], we assume that serious threats to
safety result from a stochastic process, whereby chance
combinations of small errors or defects in any of the 3
dimensions “snowball” or link up unpredictably to cause
major accidents or harm. The dimensions are however
interdependent, i.e. changes in one dimension have
important effects on other dimensions, which may
enhance or decrease safety risks, or modify them in a
variety of other ways (see Figure 1). For example a cul-
ture defect might allow a systems error to persist, which
would have been quickly rectified in a more appropriate
culture (see example, below). Unlike the Reason model,
therefore, this 3 dimensional model recognises the fact
that safety defects interact with each other more dynami-
cally than by “lining up”, and that this interactivity is very
important in understanding and tackling them. Conver-
sely, the model provides a framework for describing the
ways in which systems successfully prevent error, by
arranging mutually supportive interactions between
dimensions to promote resilience.
Advantages of this model
This simple model has some useful properties for a the-
oretical framework for research on healthcare safety at
the micro level:
1. It can be applied to all internal threats to safety at
microsystem level that we have so far identified.
2. It permits a plausible description of the way in
which flawed systems, flawed attitudes/culture and
inappropriate technology can form a mutually sup-
portive vicious circle.
3. Conversely, it explains the ineffectiveness of inter-
ventions focussed on only one dimension: This leaves
two dimensions untouched, and interactivity means
that changes in these other dimensions, either in
response to the intervention or unconnected, can
undermine effectiveness.
4. It predicts that reacting to individual events by legis-
lating for the exact circumstances which caused them
is futile, because novel stochastic combinations of
small imperfections will inevitably emerge.
5. It therefore predicts that reducing the overall level
of identifiable small imperfections in all three dimen-
sions (culture, system and technology) will reduce the
incidence of harm incidents. This is open to experi-
mental verification.
6. It predicts that, for maximal effectiveness, interven-
tions should address all three dimensions, attempting
Figure 1 The 3D model of influences on patient safety and
risk. Interactions between dimensions may be negative or positive,
uni or bi directional, and may take multiple forms.
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combined chemotherapy, where drugs target different
metabolic mechanisms. Again, this hypothesis can be
tested.
In order to carry out some preliminary testing of
whether these three concepts are sufficient to describe the
complexity of real situations, we analysed some real cases
observed during our studies in surgery, in which harm
could have or did occur [11,20]. We used a database of
recorded safety incidents recorded during an observational
study of safety on an emergency surgery unit [20]. We
analysed the influences contributing to a random sample
of 12 readmissions and complications after discharge,
using data available in study records. The attribution of
causation presented was taken from study records, edited
only where necessary to clarify how incidents could be
completely described using the three concepts of culture,
system and technology.
Results
Of a sample of 12 readmissions and complications after
discharge to an emergency surgery unit we analysed, we
found that the underlying causes could immediately be
described in terms of 1 (4/12) 2 (3/12) or all 3 (2/12) of
these dimensions. The other incidents required additional
information from case notes to analyse them, but when
this was obtained there were none which required the use
of other dimensions to explain them fully. In this particu-
lar sample we found that the influences were involved in a
total of 7/12 (system), 7/12 (culture) and 2/12 (technology)
incidents respectively. Interactions of two influences were
most commonly between culture and system. What was
most valuable was the way in which the self-reinforcing
adverse interactions between factors were highlighted by
this manner of analysis (see below and Table 1)
An illustrative example of the method taken from pre-
vious observation in our earlier work [11] is as follows:
The CO2 supply runs out at a critical moment in a
laparoscopic operation, and harm occurs because there is a
significant delay in re-establishing pneumoperitoneum,
caused by (a) delay in finding a new bottle of CO2 (b) inex-
perienced staff failing to correctly connect the new bottle (c)
a maintenance failure making the insufflators unpredict-
able and (d) lack of understanding by the surgeon of the
controls on this particular model of insufflator.
Here several influences have interacted. There are tech-
nology problems (multiple insufflators types, poor mainte-
nance) training defects (in both nursing and surgical
personnel) and work system faults (CO2 bottles not read-
ily available: training profile of staff inadequate for proce-
dure). According to our understanding of underlying
causes, the key training defects are largely a culture pro-
blem, caused by a “carry on regardless” attitude and the
belief that professionals do not need externally regulated
training. The easily foreseeable risk of this type of incident
is commonly “traded off” against reducing work-rate, and
most practising surgeons would recognise this example as
typical of the dangers of everyday practice. Our culture
permits a work process where systems analysis would
identify multiple avoidable high risk areas, including
working with equipment well known to be unreliable, or
for which the team has inadequate training.
Discussion
The model closest to our suggestion in the current litera-
ture is the SEIPS model developed by Carayon and Smith.
They propose a 5 dimensional model for organisational
error, which includes Environment and Organisation,
Tasks, People and Tools [16]. Our model collapses Tasks
and part of Organisation into the System dimension,
whilst People and parts of Organisation and Environment
are incorporated into Culture, with Technology approxi-
mating to Tools. We would suggest that our model allows
equally precise analysis in most cases, with a more parsi-
monious approach which directs attention towards cor-
rectable problems in the health care organisation. In most
real research and practice applications of safety science,
the infrastructure and the personnel are not easily modi-
fied, but are all too easily blamed in post-hoc incident ana-
lysis; therefore little is lost and a good deal may be gained
by excluding them as remediable factors in our model.
The 3 dimensions have a direct bearing on all activity at
microsystem level which is obvious to the observer, and
focussing on them therefore concentrates analysis on the
tangible and remediable. As Reason points out [36], safety
analysis needs to be constrained by what is remediable
within an organisation, and causation becomes progres-
sively more difficult to determine as one moves from
the active error towards concepts such as “management
ethos”. A methodology which can clearly define the influ-
ences evident at “microsystem” level has obvious applic-
ability which can easily be lost in more complex
frameworks such as SEIPS or Vincent’s London protocol [
[12], as Molloy et al point out [37]. Where higher-level
influences are important, this will normally be evident
from the conclusions of the 3D analysis. In the extended
example, the tolerance of training and maintenance
defects begs obvious questions about priorities at higher
levels in the organisation.
Limitations
Although we argue for a data-driven model, we concede
that this early proposal is derived from literature analysis,
reasoning and limited testing, and therefore requires con-
siderable further validation work to demonstrate its uti-
lity relative to existing frameworks. The analysis of our
cases might have had greater face validity if we had asked
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this would have required detailed explanation of the con-
cepts followed by a training process.
Because this model is focussed on analysis and predic-
tion at the microsystem level, it does not directly deal with
the higher level influences which may affect this level. For
example, selection and training of personnel, staffing levels
and management policies on issues such as discipline and
risk management are issues which can have major effects
on safety at the microsystem level. We would argue, and
so far our experience supports this, that these higher level
influences necessarily act via their effects on the three
dimensions we focus on. Therefore higher level influences
will not necessarily be missed by using the model: rather
their importance will emerge from detailed analysis of the
nature of the specific culture, technology or system defects
identified in any specific case.
Conclusions
We believe this theoretical model may be useful in several
ways: to classify and understand threats to safety: to
develop tools for analysing incidents: and to generate
hypotheses about potential safety interventions, for experi-
mental testing. We believe there is potential for developing
a quantifiable measure of system risk by applying statistical
analysis to real outcomes data, and modelling the assign-
ment of different values to the risk elements in each
dimension. As the basis for an audit approach, this could
give an institution a clearer understanding of its’ greatest
threats to safety. Allied to an FMEA-type prospective sur-
vey of risk, it could enhance understanding of “latent con-
ditions” and guide prophylactic action. We propose to
develop some of these lines of enquiry in future studies,
and would welcome feedback and discussion from others
interested in this field of work.
There is a need for a simple but comprehensive model
to explain errors and harm in surgical care and to evaluate
preventative interventions at the level of direct patient
care. We propose a model which uses only three dimen-
sions to classify problems and solutions, uses standard
definitions of terms, and is supported by limited testing on
observation of real instances. The model leads to a testable
Table 1 3D analysis of some example incidents in emergency general surgery
Case Description of Problem Analysis of Contributory Factors Classification Commentary
1 Long term Crohn’s disease:
Emergency stricture resection for
obstruction. ARDS
postoperatively
Overhydration, no antibiotics: 2y to
deficient protocols, supervision,
training.
Culture
+System
failures
Culture accepted system where undertrained
juniors did their best without adequate supervision
- as no alternative appeared possible.
2 91 yr old with apparently
strangulated hernia, but
negative exploration, followed
by MI
Inappropriately rapid decision to
operate without investigation
Culture failure Radiology and senior consultation available, but
not accessed due to “macho” culture. Trainee’s
perception of their role emphasised self- reliance
and decisiveness, and characterised use of
expensive investigations and discussion with
seniors as indicators of lack of experience and
competence
3 Possible intestinal obstruction;
significant arm soft tissue injury
from CT contrast extravasation
Lack of protocol and experience, plus
equipment which hinders immediate
detection and cessation of injection
Culture,
System and
Technology
failure
System could have been devised to defend against
obvious risks of technology but culture did not
demand it. More detailed and explicit protocol
incorporating checks of intravenous access quality
before and during infusion needed: however
culture resistant to close adherence to
standardised protocols, which is regarded as
interfering with professional freedom
4 Second laparotomy for ileus
after initial division of adhesions
Overhydration, late withdrawal of
epidural: 2y to lack of protocols
System +
Culture
failures
Lack of protocols, Failure of culture to insist on
closer surveillance. Inadequate handover of
information at shift changes. Excessive workload at
times, putting pressure on junior doctors’ memory
and stamina.
5 Schizophrenic with missed
caecal volvulus; anastomotic
leak, 2
nd laparotomy, ITU
Failure to perform appropriately timely
investigations or postop surveillance
in difficult patient
Culture failure System malfunctioned due to cultural acceptance
of suboptimal care for “difficult” patients. Blood
tests and observations omitted to avoid
challenging situations
6 Pneumonia and resp. failure
after long laparotomy
Inadequate analgesia from failed
epidural, then oversedation from
incorrectly prescribed PCA
System &
Technology
failures
Inadequate access to prompt expert pain
management; PCA pump easy to misuse. No clear
detailed protocol for epidural or PCA care. De-
skilling of junior medical and nursing staff by
reliance on specialist pain team who were not
always promptly available. Juniors reluctant either
to make decision to change analgesic strategy or
to ask for senior guidance.
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a number of properties which suggest it may be useful in
healthcare quality improvement practice.
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